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Mrs G. Oner, a 58-year-old woman, had a massive myocardial infarction after an aneurysmectomy being kept alive for
several weeks by a left ventricular assist device. It appears that she may survive. However, Mrs Oner has become clinically
depressed and is strongly considering discontinuing hemodynamic support. After a discussion about her condition during
which she learned that survival could not be assured, she elected what the hospital calls “code two” do not resuscitate (DNR)
status (no cardiopulmonary resuscitation, no intubation) but wants all other treatment to continue “as long as it will help her.”
She did not discuss this decision with her husband, an internationally acclaimed professor of law, beforehand. When he visits
later that day, she unexpectedly has a stroke accompanied by respiratory difficulty and Professor Oner insists that “everything”
be done. The team informs him that the patient will not be intubated, per the code two status. He insists that he is her legal
surrogate and demands the DNR status be withdrawn. Which options are unethical?
A. The husband is Mrs Oner’s legal surrogate. He can order a change in the DNR status.
B. The professor will likely sue. Intubate.
C. The DNR status, regardless of the circumstances, stands legally and ethically.
D. The DNR is invalid because the spouse was not informed of the change.
E. The DNR should be suspended until the patient’s neurologic status is determined.What we’ve got here is failure to communicate. Some men
you just can’t reach, so you get what we had here . . .Well, he
gets it. And I don’t like it any more than you.
Captain, Road Prison 38 (Cool Hand Luke)
Prolonged suffering or disabling feebleness prepares
the patient and family by casting death as a release. But as in
the present case, sudden shattering of hope can be painful,
especially so when a vital recourse is unexpectedly taken
away. DNR orders are emotion-laden but usually straight-
forward situations. However, whenever close family mem-
bers disagree with the doctor or each other and death is the
arbiter, conflict can become exponential.
Patients who remain critically ill for long periods tend
to recover slowly but can suddenly worsen catastrophically.
In a moment, the prognosis can change, and because good
ethical reasoning should be based on clinical reality, the
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1384ethical justification of continued treatment needs to be
reconsidered.
From the beginning of Western medicine, the standard
of care was for physicians not to take on desperate cases in
which they could reliably predict a high risk of death.1 The
correlate of this pervasive standard of care was that physi-
cians should stop treating patients who became so desper-
ately ill that they were likely to die. These standards dated
from the time of the Hippocratic texts and continued until
the early 18th century in the Medicus Politcus of Friedrich
Hoffmann. Two important concerns supported these ethi-
cal standards:
The first appealed to the physician’s self-interest. In a
crowded, competitive, completely unregulated market-
place for medical and surgical services, practitioners who
became known for losing their patients would not succeed,
with dire economic consequences. The prudent physician
learned how to make a prognosis of death, a skill that the
Hippocratic texts prize and document. They believed that
when the physician prognosticated death, he should with-
draw so that the disease or injury, and not the physician,
would be blamed for the ensuing death.
The second appealed to the clinical reality that disease
or injury may become so severe that no medical interven-
tion can alter the course to death. Disease or injury was
considered to have “overmastered” the patient, and the
wise physician knew not to expect medicine’s powers to
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cases is a kind of madness, theHippocratic text admonished
the reader. In contemporary terms, to continue useless
treatment violates professional integrity.
Noting the onset of death was simple for eons—when
the signs of life were absent, death was everlasting. Then a
half-century ago, a retired professor of engineering, a sur-
gical resident, and an engineering student combined exter-
nal electrical shock, mouth-to-nose ventilation, and closed
chest compressions to jump-start life. This genius team
used their method, which they named cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR), on 20 patients and resuscitated 14.2
CPR complicated the determination of end-of-life and has
provided bioethicists with perhaps their most popular
topics.
The method became widely used, often in the absence
of the attending physician, including on patients with ter-
minal illnesses who then had to die twice. Resuscitation
theoretically was not denied anyone, but when determined
inappropriate, became a “slow code,” passively allowing the
proper ending. This subterfuge worked erratically but most
importantly, hospitalized patients had little input about the
second most important event in their life.
Multiple people with differing involvements sharing
authority and responsibility for important decisions set a
stage for conflict. DNR seems simple; those involved com-
plicate the process because of uncertainties, differing goals,
the gravity of death’s finality, and emotions.
The husband’s frustration is understandable. Not only
have his hopes for a future with his wife been dashed, he
now has been placed in charge but without the authority to
authorize a life-saving course of action. This is because, as a
matter of both ethics and law, as his wife’s surrogate
decision maker, he is also obligated to follow the standard
of substituted judgment: ostensibly making the decision his
wife would make.3 Although Mr Oner is legally in author-
ity, he does not have the ethical right to misrepresent his
wife’s decision. Option A is invalid.
Option B should give a sane physician cause for reflec-
tion. Sane physicians, however, should also remember in
circumstances such as this the basic tenets of the ethics and
law of informed consent: competent, adult patients have
the right to make their own decisions about their medical
care, and everyone else—the care team and family members—
is obligated to respect those decisions. The patient’s last
competent decision legally controls. The legal risks actually
run in the other direction: overriding the patient’s in-
formed decision at her husband’s request opens the physi-
cian to liability for battery.4
Option D stresses the point that the dead patient is not
the one with regrets and guilt. The actual take-home sig-
nificance is that preventive ethics should be an essential part
of every physician’s practice.4 Although patients are the first
priority, relatives indirectly are part of the physician’s pro-
fessional duties and must be shown every consideration and
kindness. Properly, surrogates should be present when key
decisions are made, or if the patient requests solitudinousdecision making, it should be recorded in the medical
record with the patient’s signature.
Traditionally, option C is the ethically (and legally)
required option. Every measure short of CPR and intuba-
tion should be undertaken if the DNR order is properly
observed. If she recovers her decision-making capacity, her
informed consent should also guide all subsequent treat-
ment decisions. If this is the choice, it should be clearly
explained to the patient’s husband. He should be sup-
ported through the process of coming to understand that
his decision-making role and the team’s response are alike
constrained by respect for his wife’s autonomy.
For the first time in more than 100 published ethical
cases, we have crafted a second correct andmore acceptable
option, suspension of DNR orders. Suspending a DNR
order cursorily may seem the same as discontinuing it, but
suspension differs in that resuscitation is allowed for a
particular purpose and period. Option E, suspending the
DNR order, is ethically acceptable intraoperatively, with
the consent of the patient or surrogate.5 An example would
be when relieving a painful bowel obstruction in a patient
with a DNR order. DNR suspension in the OR respects the
professional obligation of the surgeon to provide appropri-
ate surgical therapy. Otherwise, the intrusion of patient
autonomy may restrict optimal outcomes of supportive
therapy. The left ventricular assist device is supportive
surgical therapy, albeit extended, and the stroke was likely
caused by an embolism as a result of that therapy. Another
requirement is that to be allowed, resuscitation efforts must
be likely to be successful. Intubation is likely to be success-
ful. Temporary ventilation will allow time to assess the
severity of the stroke. And if severe, discontinuation of
cardiac support will insure against the undesirable outcome
of a severely disabled individual continuing to live, which is
the major goal of the DNR order. Suspension of the DNR
order is thus compatible with its goal in this case.
Walker’s guidelines for suspension of a DNR order in
the operating room state that surgeons must, “speak di-
rectly with the patient or surrogate to clarify the patient’s
goals and the reason for the DNR order . . .”6 This clarifi-
cation should properly be discussed with the husband.
Furthermore, given the husband’s objections, the patient’s
decision to accept a DNR order in the absence of her
husband’s support and counsel is questionable.
There is an important preventive ethics lesson from this
case.Code status is asmuch a relations concern as is possible in
medicine; it involves more than the doctor/patient relation-
ship. Mrs Oner should have been asked to have her husband
present for this discussion and her subsequent reflection and
decision. This is not just because he has a stake in her decision,
but more importantly, he is an irreplaceable source of psycho-
social support as she comes to terms with a disease that may
well be about to “overmaster” her.
Important medical ethical decisions are always strongly
context dependent, and as a beloved professor emphasized
many years ago, “Never say never (or always) in medicine.
It will come back to haunt you.”
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